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I. Introduction
When companies operate across multiple jurisdictions, they
may find themselves subject to conflicting laws that are difficult, if
not impossible, to reconcile. The intersection of European privacy
laws and broad discovery requirements for U.S. litigation creates
now well-known conflicting legal duties that require companies to
expunge information in Europe that they are required to preserve in
the United States. However, researchers, scholars and practitioners
have given limited attention to the ways in which information
preserved for discovery could violate European data protection laws
because the more visible problem is violations that occur when
information is actually produced in Europe and transferred to the
United States for use in a lawsuit. However, the time is ripe for
European regulators to grasp on to these potential preservation
violations for two reasons. First, large corporations are explicit
about how much data they are over-preserving and have brought
the issue into the limelight in an attempt to effect changes to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Secondly, because EU regulators
are increasingly enforcing data privacy laws more vigorously and
are poised to begin demanding compliance to a much greater
degree. It is possible that the vast quantities of data on hold for
potential litigation in the United States inherently violate the
European data protection laws to such an extent that emboldened
EU regulatory authorities could sanction multinationals in Europe
for privacy transgressions in the United States.
II. The Origins of the Conflict
Views concerning the concept of the "right to privacy" diverge
remarkably between citizens of the United States and the European
Union - a difference that is reflected in our respective legal cultures.
Observers have identified the fundamental contrast as between
"privacy as an aspect of dignity and privacy as an aspect of
liberty."' The foundational European privacy rights are the former
and protect "one's image, name, and reputation," ensuring "a right
to respect and personal dignity." 2 American privacy rights, on the
1. James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus
Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1161 (2004); See generally Robert C. Post, Three Concepts of
Privacy, 89 GEO. L.J. 2087 (2001).
2. Whitman, supra note 1, at 1161.
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other hand, are liberty-oriented and protect "the right to freedom
from intrusions by the state, especially in one's own home." 3
Some commentators claim that the contemporary European
view emerged largely as a reaction to fascism and transgressions
against personal integrity by authoritarian states during World War
II.4 Others propose the European concept of the right to privacy is
an extension to the general public of a right to respect that existed in
the monarchical tradition on the continent for centuries, but that
was previously reserved only for those of high social status.5
Whatever its origins, the privilege to keep personal information
private is enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union as "the right to the protection of personal data"
and is "secured by statute in each Member State."6
For Americans, the concept of privacy is more elusive. While it
is not a right explicitly protected by the founding documents, the
Supreme Court has declared it is in the "penumbra" of other
guarantees enumerated in the Bill of Rights.7  Unlike the
comprehensive framework governing the protection of personal
data in the EU, American privacy laws have been called a
"patchwork quilt" of industry specific regulations.8 To onlookers
from the continent, Americans seem to routinely compromise
privacy protections in favor of other fundamental rights such as
freedom of expression. By European standards, one distinct area
where the right to privacy is egregiously compromised is in the
discovery phase of civil litigation in U.S. courts.
3. Id.
4. Andrew T. Kenyon & Megan Richardson, New Dimensions in Privacy:
Communications Technologies, Media Practices and Law, in NEW DIIENSIONS IN PRIVACY
LAW: INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES, 1 (Andrew T. Kenyon &
Megan Richardson eds., 2006).
5. Whitman, supra note 1, at 1166.
6. Lee A. Bygrave, International Agreements to Protect Personal Data, in GLOBAL
PRIVACY PROTECTION: THE FIRST GENERATION 15, 31 (James B. Rule & Graham
Greenleaf eds., 2009); See generally Directive 95/46, of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to
the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data Nov. 23,
1995, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC), available at http://eur-lex.europa.
eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995LOO46:en:HTML.
7. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) ("Various guarantees
create zones of privacy.").
8. Jeff Bounds, In U.S., Privacy Laws Are "Patchwork Quilt," DALLAS BUSINESS
JOURNAL CONFIDENTIAL (2011), http://www.bizjoumals.com/dallas/blog/
2011/07/in-us-privacy-laws-are-patchwork.htnl.
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In the United States over the last century, the right to
"discover" relevant information from an adverse party in civil
litigation has become increasingly broad. In 1947, the U.S. Supreme
Court declared, "[m]utual knowledge of all the relevant facts
gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation." 9 In the
1960s and 1970s, the discovery right expanded to its peak, in part as
a tool to aid private litigants defending enforcement of legislation
designed to benefit the public, such as civil rights and antitrust
laws. 10 As Professor Geoffrey Hazard points out in an article
published in 1998 - the same year the most comprehensive data
protection regime in the world was to be implemented throughout
the European Union - broad discovery "has become, at least for our
era, a procedural institution perhaps of virtually constitutional
foundation . . . . [W]hen litigation eventuates, no secrets shall be
hid.""1
According to the preeminent American research institute on the
subject, the Sedona Conference, the law concerning cross-border
discovery and data privacy is "an area often thought of as so
complex and confounding that it has been largely ignored."12 But,
addressing the underlying conflict of laws is only becoming more
important because more companies are operating across borders,
and more individuals conduct their activities on a global scale,
whether in person or over the Internet. Because of new laws in
Europe designed to address this, even data held in the United States
may be subject to European data privacy rules.
To advocates of strict, dignity-based privacy rights, liberal
disclosure at the American level is particularly ominous in the
digital age because more data is generated, circulated, preserved,
9. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).
10. Richard L. Marcus, The 2006 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure Governing Discovery of Electronically Stored Information: Fitting Electronic
Discovery into the Overall Discovery Mix, in ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY AND DIGITAL
EVIDENCE: CASES AND MATERIALS, 1, 2-3 (Shira Scheindlin et al. eds., 2009).
11. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., From Whom No Secrets Are Hid, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1665,
1694 (1997).
12. THE SEDONA CONFERENCE WORKING GRP. 6 ON INT'L ELEC. INFO. MGMT.,
DISCOVERY & DISCLOSURE (WG6), INTERNATIONAL PRINCIPLES ON DISCOVERY,
DISCLOSURE, AND DATA PROTECTION: BEST PRACTICES, RECOMMENDATIONS AND
PRINCIPLES FOR ADDRESSING THE PRESERVATION DISCOVERY OF PROTECTED DATA IN U.S.
LITIGATION vi (Amor A. Esteban et al., eds., European Union Edition, Public
Comment Version, 2011) [herinafter SEDONA BEST PRACTICES], available at
http://www.thesedonaconference.org/publications html?grp=wgsl60.
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and ultimately, produced. Under the European framework, this
data is subject to strict privacy protocols that may be breached when
litigants attempt to produce information for American discovery.
Companies that can expect to be sued in the United States have
begun preserving mass quantities of data to comply with what they
believe U.S. law requires from an entity that may become involved
in litigation. This practice of data hoarding creates the potential for
conflict with European data privacy laws because multinational
corporations keep information that pertains to people in the
European Union or that otherwise falls within the scope of EU
regulations.
A. The Duty to Preserve and the Over-Preservation Phenomenon
The duty to preserve relevant information for ongoing or future
litigation is a well-established aspect of American discovery
procedures rooted in the common law. The duty can arise, even
before a party comes in contact with the court, whenever litigation is
reasonably anticipated, threatened, or pending.13 The preservation
requirement is intended to prevent spoliation of discoverable
evidence that could be germane to a lawsuit and the obligation
attaches to potential plaintiffs and defendants alike.' 4 Although the
general obligation to identify, locate, and maintain relevant
information has not changed substantively with the proliferation of
electronically stored information (ESI), the medium presents unique
challenges.
When the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) were
amended in 2006 to better accommodate the discovery of
electronically stored information, the changes did not include
affirmative provisions concerning preservation. 15 Instead, the FRCP
regulate the preservation of ESI through sanctions. Allowing a
system to continue its normal operation, with knowledge that
information relevant to litigation will be lost, is an omission
sanctionable under the Federal Rules. 16  Rule 37(e), however,
13. THE SEDONA CONFERENCE WORKING GRP. ON ELEC. DOCUMENT RETENTION &
PROD. (WG1), THE SEDONA CONFERENCE COMMENTARY ON LEGAL HOLDS: THE TRIGGER
& THE PROCESS 1 (Conor R. Crowley et al. eds., Public Comment Version, 2007)
[herinafter SEDONA LEGAL HOLDS], available at http://www.thesedonaconference.
org/publications html.
14. Id.
15. Richard L. Marcus, supra note 10, at 10.
16. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(f) advisory committee's note (2000).
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provides a "safe harbor" for parties who have lost evidence through
"the routine, good-faith operation of an electronic information
system."17 As the committee notes point out, this means that when
the duty to preserve is triggered, a litigant may be required to
institute a "litigation hold" which involves intervening in the
routine operation of an electronic system to ensure that relevant
information is not destroyed.18
B. The Alleged Lack of Clear Guidance to Litigants Concerning
Preservation Duties
Large, multinational corporations, often parties to discovery-
intensive litigation, claim that ambiguity in the law forces them to
over-preserve as the only risk-free way to navigate divergent
standards among the circuit courts concerning what triggers the
duty to preserve, the scope of the preservation requirement, and the
level of culpability required to warrant sanctions for the spoliation
of ESI.
Microsoft, for example, alleges that plaintiffs abuse the inherent
uncertainty in the fact-specific, "ever-shifting case law" because
"[t]he threat of a spoliation claim - or even the threat of extremely
broad discovery or discovery-on-discovery in an attempt to
manufacture a spoliation claim - tends to drive up the value of an
otherwise weak case." 19 Thus, because even negligent conduct can
lead to sanctions in some circuits, Microsoft maintains, "over-
preservation is the only rational response to a system that imposes
such high costs for such a low level of culpability." 20 The issue has
led to a raging debate over whether the FRCP should be further
amended to level the playing field. Large companies assert that
"conflicting and ambiguous case law on the duty to preserve" 21
requiring companies to retain massive amounts of information to
avoid spoliation sanctions in U.S. courts has created a crisis in civil
litigation that should be resolved through amendments to the
17. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(e).
18. FED. R. Civ. P., supra note 16.
19. Letter from David M. Howard, Corporate Vice President, Deputy Gen.
Counsel, Microsoft Corporation, et al., to Honorable David G. Campbell, Chair,
Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules (Aug. 31, 2011) [hereinafter Microsoft Letter] 6,
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/DallasMiniConf_
Comments/ Microsoft.pdf.
20. Id. at 6.
21. Id. at 3.
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Federal Rules. 22 Whether or not changes to the rules are actually
warranted has become the subject of conferences and scholarly
debate,23 elicited prolific comment from practitioners, 24 and
attracted the attention of Congress.25 Whatever the merit of those
pleas, the discussion has thrown light on the extent to which
companies are amassing and storing nonessential data.
C. The Over-Preservation Practices of Multinational Corporations
In an open letter to the Chair of the Advisory Committee on
Civil Rules in preparation for the Mini-Conference on Preservation
and Sanctions in September 2011, Microsoft described in detail its
"over-inclusive" preservation practices. The company uses a
"custodian-based approach" to litigation and discovery, which
means they preserve all relevant documents associated with a
specific person. Ultimately, however, only a very small percentage
of the massive volume of data originally collected is deemed
relevant and discoverable at trial.
Microsoft reports that about 12.5% of the company's domestic
employees are currently under legal holds for pending or ongoing
litigation, but only about one-third of those cases concern active
litigation. 26 "That means Microsoft preserves the vast majority of
material based on some trigger event other than the filing of an
22. Lawyers for Civil Justice, Reshaping the Rules of Civil Procedure for the 21st
Century, CONFERENCE ON CIVIL LITIGATION, DUKE LAW SCHOOL 35-36 (May 10-11,
2010), http:/ / lfcj.digidoq.com/ BLAP/ Federal% 20Rules% 20of %20Civil %20Proced
ure/FRCP%20Wt%2OPpr%20FINAL %20CLEAN%20050210%/ 20corrrected.pdf.
23. See Mini-Conference on Pres. and Sanctions: Judicial Conference
Subcommittee on Discovery (Sept. 9, 2011), http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAnd
Policies/FederalRulemaking/Overview/DallasMiniConfSept201 1.aspx; See also The
Legal Technology Leadership Summit: Reducing the Costs and Risks of Over-Preservation
of Data, ABOVE THE LAW (July 1, 2011, 3:24 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/
2011/07/the-legal-technology-leadership-summit-reducing-the-costs-and-risks-of-
over-preservation-of-data/.
24. Ariana J. Tadler & Henry J. Kelston, Fears of E-Discovery Burden Are
Exaggerated, LAW TECHNOLOGY NEWS (Dec. 20, 2011), http://www.1aw.com/jsp/
lawtechnologynews/PubArticleLTN.jsp?id=1202536149329&slreturn=1.
25. Hearing on the Costs and Burdens of Civil Discovery Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution, 112th Congress (2011) [hereinafter Discovery Hearing],
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/hear12132011 2.htmd (last visited Nov. 3,
2012).
26. Microsoft Letter, supra note 19, at 3. This is a total of 14,805 separate
custodian legal holds, but only 6,732 unique custodians because some of the
company's senior managers and executives are under legal holds for multiple
issues.
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actual lawsuit." 27  If a matter reaches litigation, most of the
custodians who were placed under a legal hold in connection with
the matter contribute nothing to the information actually produced
because most of the data collected is irrelevant or otherwise
unusable.28 In its submission to the conference, Microsoft cites a
recent survey conducted by the Searle Center on Law, Regulation,
and Economic Growth at Northwestern University, for the
proposition that "only 1 in 1000 pages produced in discovery is ever
actually used as evidence to resolve the merits of a case." 29 As
Microsoft outlines in the letter, "the remaining 999 pages are
produced at enormous cost - because they are the tip of a very large
ice-berg." 30 For every 2.3 MB of data that are actually used in
litigation, Microsoft preserves 787.5 GB of data - a ratio of 340,000 to
1.31 Microsoft claims this disparity "stems from the conservative
approach [it] takes at the earliest stages of a matter in order to avoid
backward-looking scrutiny regarding the scope of preservation." 32
Judge Rosenthal explicitly acknowledged this problem in Rimkus
Consulting Group, Inc. v. Cammarata, noting that "[t]he frequency of
spoliation allegations may lead to decisions about preservation
based more on fear of potential future sanctions than on reasonable
need for information." 33
Thomas Hill, Associate General Counsel for General Electric
(GE) echoed Microsoft's concerns in his written testimony for the
December 2011 Congressional hearing on The Costs and Burdens of
Civil Discovery. He asserted that "GE must guess whether a case
will ever be filed, guess as to what claims may ever be brought, and
then do its best to preserve an unspecified amount of information
27. Id.
28. Ultimately, Microsoft collects data from only 12 custodians rather than the
45 whose data was preserved under the original hold. Even information from the
twelve custodians who ultimately contribute to a case is "further reduced through
filtering based on date ranges, search terms, de-duplication, and other data
minimization processes." Through the use of third party vendors, Microsoft
eliminates, on average, nearly 95% of the data originally under litigation hold for a
case. Then, the company's attorneys review and reduce that information resulting





33. Rimkus Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Cammarata, 688 F. Supp. 2d 598, 607 (S.D.
Tex. 2010).
264 [Vol. 36:1
U.S. Preservation Requirements and EU Data Protection
for an indefinite period of time." 34 By way of example, Hill offered
that if management makes a decision that could conceivably lead to
a shareholder derivative suit against GE, current law requires the
company to begin preserving potentially relevant information if
they believe litigation could be "reasonably anticipated." However,
without knowing which claims may be asserted, and without any
plaintiff, judge, or opposing counsel with whom to negotiate the
relevance of ESI, the company must over-preserve to avoid the risk
of sanctions in a case that may never be filed. 35 He then described a
specific matter, limited to GE's U.S. operations, in which the
company had been preserving information for years even though no
litigation is pending. 36 "In a company the size of GE," posits Hill,
"it would not be out of the ordinary for hundreds or even thousands
of individuals to be involved in a subject matter that becomes the
subject of litigation that lasts for many years." 37
Although neither Microsoft nor GE specifically mentions any
legal problems this mass preservation creates for them abroad, the
practice undoubtedly runs afoul of non-U.S. privacy laws, especially
those of the European Union. Under the arguably far-reaching EU
rules, information need not be located in an EU Member State or
even refer to someone living there to be subject to the strictures of
EU data protection. This means that large multinationals, which
operate globally and that have mobile employees working and
interacting across multiple jurisdictions, create and collect data that
is subject to EU regulation. Under those laws, the indiscriminate
accumulation of this data in the United States, as described above,
could be a sanctionable violation. The next section provides an
overview of the European Privacy Framework in an attempt to
outline the ways in which a wide range of potential evidence can fall
within its ambit to inform a discussion on the conflicting legal duties
created by the European data protection laws and American
discovery procedures.
34. Discovery Hearing, supra note 25 (testimony of Thomas H. Hill, Associate
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III. European Privacy Laws and Their Enforcement
A. The European Privacy Framework
In 1995, the European Parliament passed Directive 95/46/EC
on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data (the
Directive or the Privacy Directive).38 It is the centerpiece of a
framework of data protection laws in the European Union and the
European Economic Area (EEA) that have been called the "most
ambitious, comprehensive and complex in the field." 39 These laws
are based on principles of respect and dignity and they protect the
rights of individuals to control information pertaining to them.40
The 1995 Directive treats the protection of personal data as a
fundamental human right, thereby embodying "a profoundly
European vision of what protection of privacy and personal data
should involve."41
The Directive is a model for legislation, which was enacted into
law at the national level in each Member State. 42 It is a distinct type
of legislation from an EU-wide "regulation," 43 which would create a
uniform law across the European Union. As a result, while data
protection laws across the European Union are based on the same
principles and are therefore similar, they are not the same, and
entities operating in different states are expected to comply with the
rules of each state to which their data processing activities are
subject. 44
38. Directive 95/46, supra note 6.
39. Bygrave, supra note 6, at 30.
40. Whitman, supra note 1, at 1161.
41. Bygrave, supra note 6, at 33. This creates a sometimes-awkward balance
between the European Union's goals of economic harmony and its strict notions of
privacy. The Directive seeks to facilitate economic growth through the free flow of
goods, persons, services, capital, and personal data by making privacy laws
compatible across the EU Member States. At the same time, however, the Directive
seeks to protect the right to personal privacy that is inherently jeopardized by this
level of data circulation. Id. at 32.
42. Directive 95/46, supra note 6, at preamble recital 9; Bygrave, supra note 6, at 22.
43. Not to be confused with the word "regulation" in general.
44. The Directive, therefore, is a "lowest common denominator" establishing
minimum requirements on which Member States must fashion their data protection
laws. In fact, Member States have sometimes passed laws that are inconsistent with
the Directive, specifically those pertaining to the transfer of data outside the
European Union. Bygrave, supra note 6, at 32; See also ANDREW SERWIN,
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The Directive applies to "personal data," which is defined
broadly as any information that can directly or indirectly identify a
person.45 This can include "anything from a name, a photo, an
email address, bank details, your posts on social networking
websites, your medical information, or your computer's IP
address." 46 The person to whom the data refers is the "data subject"
and the data belongs to that individual, not the entity that holds it.47
Use of the information is "data processing," defined as "[a]ny
operation or set of operations which is performed upon personal
data, whether or not by automatic means, such as collection,
recording, organization, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval,
consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or
otherwise making available, alignment or combination, blocking,
erasure or destruction."48 Under these broad definitions, an email
from Europe or an attached document may contain "personal data,"
and could potentially be evidence that might be preserved for an
unspecified period of time in the event of a litigation hold.
The Directive states that data must be processed "fairly and
lawfully; collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes
and not further processed in a way incompatible with those
purposes."49 Furthermore, the personal data is restricted to that
which is "adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the
purposes for which they are collected and/or further processed."50
Nor can personal data be kept in a form that identifies the data
subject for "longer than is necessary for the purposes for which the
data were collected." 51
In terms of U.S.-based litigation, data that has been preserved
INFORMATION SECURITY AND PRIVACY: A GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
COMPLIANCE 78 (2009).
45. THOMAS J. SHAW, INFORMATION SECURITY AND PRIVACY: A PRACTICAL GUIDE
FOR GLOBAL EXECUTIVEs, LAWYERS AND TECHNOLOGISTs 80 (A.B.A., 2011).
46. Press Release, European Commission, Commission Proposes a
Comprehensive Reform of Data Protection Rules to Increase Users' Control of Their
Data and to Cut Costs for Businesses (Jan. 25, 2012) [hereinafter Commission Press
Release], http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/12/ 46&
format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (last visited Nov. 3,
2012).
47. SERWIN, supra note 44, at 4.
48. Directive 95/46, supra note 6, art. 2(b).
49. Id. art. 6(a)-(b).
50. Id. art. 6(c).
51. Id. art. 6(e).
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may be "adequate and relevant" to a particular legal proceeding,
but it is unlikely that that information is ever originally collected for
use in a lawsuit. When a company retains data for litigation, EU
law requires that the data subject explicitly consent to that use
because this type of preservation is deemed "further processing"
that is conducted for a purpose unrelated to the reasons the data
were originally collected. 52
The concept of a "data controller" is also central to the
Directive's framework. This is the person or entity that "determines
the purposes and means of the processing of personal data." 53 The
"data processor" processes the data on behalf of the controller and
could be a third party such as a cloud service provider.
Additionally, the Directive mandates that each Member State
establish an independent Data Protection Supervisory Authority
(DPA) endowed with investigative powers and the ability to bring
legal proceedings. 54 Delegates from each country's DPA, together
with representatives of the European Commission and the European
Data Protection Supervisor make up the "Article 29 Working Party
on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of
Personal Data" (Article 29 Working Party or Working Party)55 The
Working Party has a profound influence on implementation of the
Directive through its recommendations, opinions, and working
documents throughout the European Union.
The Article 29 Working Party has recognized that the concept of
processing contained in the Directive directly implicates the
preservation practices of U.S. discovery requirements. Retention of
data is processing under EU law and "[c]ontrollers in the European
Union have no legal ground to store personal data at random for an
unlimited period of time because of the possibility of litigation in
the United States however remote this may be."5 6 In American
52. This is in addition to the "unambiguous consent" the data subject must
give, even for an initial act of processing. Id. art. 7(a); Legitimate Reasons for
Processing of Personal Data, EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION SUPERVISOR - THE EUROPEAN
GUARDIAN OF PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION, http://www.edps.europa.eu/ EDP
SWEB/edps/site/mySite/QA6 (last visited Nov. 6, 2012).
53. Directive 95/46, supra note 6, art. 2(d).
54. Id. art. 28(1)-(3); they can also typically impose fines, although some DPAs
cannot. See SERWIN, supra note 44, at 79.
55. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 45, at 79.
56. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Working Document 1/2009 on Pre-
Trial Discovery for Cross Border Civil Litigation 7 (No. 00339/09/EN, WP 158, 2009)
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courts, however, the expectation is that a company that chooses to
do business in the United States will abide by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, which mandate data preservation in some
circumstances.5 7 But, as the Working Party points out, this is
problematic because employees and customers of such a company
are "data subjects" and not parties to any decision to do business in
the United States that could expose their data to U.S. disclosure
rules.58 Under the current EU regime, even an order from a U.S.
judge directing a party to preserve data would not automatically
create the legal grounds for doing so.
The Directive also closely regulates the transfer of information
from one country to another - often a necessary step in producing
evidence for U.S.-based litigation.5 9 Article 25 of the Directive
prohibits the transfer of data to "third countries" - meaning
countries outside the European Economic Area - that do not
provide an "adequate level of data protection." 60 The standard used
to determine which countries' data protection regimes are
"adequate" is stringent, and like most non-EEA countries, U.S.
privacy laws do not qualify. 61 Lawmakers have tried to alleviate
difficulties created by the incompatibility between European data
protection laws and U.S. discovery practices by approving regimes
that allow multinational corporations to move data across borders if
they adhere to certain standards endorsed by European data
protection authorities. 62  If data is preserved and transferred
[hereinafter WP 158], available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/ privacy/
docs/wpdocs/2009/wpl58_en.pdf.
57. Id. at 8.
58. Id.
59. Directive 95/46, supra note 6, art. 25.
60. Id. art. 25(1).
61. Bygrave, supra note 6, at 39.
62. Businesses can institute protocols that will bring them in line with the
European framework. For example, a multinational corporation or group of
companies can write its own privacy regulations, known as Binding Corporate
Rules (BCRs), under which intracompany transfers of personal data across borders
will not be held to violate EU data protection laws. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
supra note 45, at 81; See Overview on Binding Corporate Rules, EUROPEAN COMMISSION -
JUSTICE, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/international-
transfers/ binding-corporate-rules/indexen.htm (last updated Apr. 23, 2012).
The Directive itself also provides some exceptions to the strict regulation of data
transfers. For example, data can be transferred if the data subject gives
"unambiguous consent." Directive 95/46, supra note 6, art. 26(1)(A). Another
important exception is the United States' Safe Harbor Scheme, which allows an
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pursuant to these schemes, it is less likely to attract regulatory
attention. However, because these arrangements are focused on the
legality of data transfers, evidence that is already stored within the
United States may fall outside their purview.
B. The Potentially Broad Applicability of European Union Data
Protection Laws
While the Directive was pioneering in many ways, its drafters
were particularly bold in tackling the thorny issue of which
country's laws apply to an act of data processing. 63 Addressing
applicable law issues for multinationals operating across countries
within the European Union certainly involves complex
considerations, but applying EU law to data that lies beyond the
Member States is even more unwieldy. In some cases, the
Directive's terminology arguably provides for universal application
of European data protection laws.64
If a data controller has an "establishment" 65 in a Member State,
EU law will apply if an act of processing is performed "in the
context of activities" of its establishment there. 66 "The notion of
American company to self-certify that it complies with a set of privacy principles
approved by EU authorities. A company that ascribes to the Safe Harbor Scheme
can receive data from an entity within the EU. AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION, Supra
note 45, at 81; See Safe Harbor, EXPORT.GOV HELPING U.S. COMPANIEs EXPORT,
http://export.gov/safeharbor/ (last updated Apr. 11, 2012, 2:45 PM).
63. Monique Altheim, Article 29 Working Party Opinion 8/2010 on Applicable Law,
Article 4 (1) EU Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC and Smartphone Apps,
EDISCOVERYMAP (Jan. 5, 2011), http://ediscoverymap.com/2011/01/article-29-
working-party-opinion-82010-on-applicable-law-article-4-1-eu-directive-9546ec-and
-smartphone-apps/.
64. Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Working Document on Determining
the International Application of EU Data Protection Law to Personal Data
Processing on the Internet by Non-EU Based Web Sites at 6, No.
5035/01/EN/Final, WP 56 (May 30, 2002) [hereinafter WP 56].
65. "The place at which a controller is established, implies the effective and real
exercise of activity through stable arrangements and has to be determined in
conformity with the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities."
Id. at 8. An establishment could be a "local office, a subsidiary with legal
personality or a third party agency." Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Opinion
1/2008 on Data Protection Issues Related to Search Engines at 10, No. 00737/EN,
WP 48 (Apr. 4, 2008).
66. The key to determining whether EU law applies is the concept of the
"context of activities" introduced in Article 4(1)(a). "The notion of 'context of
activities' - and not the location of data - is a determining factor in identifying the
scope of the applicable law." Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Opinion 8/2010
on Applicable Law at 29, No. 0836-02/10/EN, WP 179, 2010) [hereinafter WP 179].
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'context of activities' implies that the applicable law is not the law of
the Member State where the controller is established, but where an
establishment of the controller is involved in activities implying the
processing of personal data." 67
For data controllers located outside the European Union, the
Directive may apply if personal data is processed on "equipment"
located inside the European Union, even if the controller has no
physical "establishment" in any Member State.68 The law that
applies is the law of the Member State where the equipment used
for data processing is located. 69 In this context, ownership of the
equipment is not required and control over it need not be complete
as long as the relevant data is processed on the controller's behalf.70
The Working Party interprets the word "equipment" broadly in part
because it is translated in other European languages as "means."7 1
Thus, "equipment" can refer to a process that is manual or
automated, including "human and/or technical intermediaries, such
as in surveys or inquiries." 72
It is the site of the equipment processing the data that
determines jurisdiction, not characteristics of the data subject. A
person need not reside in, or have citizenship of, any Member State
for the protocols of the Directive to apply to their personal data as
long as it is processed on equipment located in the European
Union.73 Accordingly, as with outsourcing or cloud computing, 74 a
The Working Party has clarified that the Directive "should apply in those cases
where there is no establishment in the EU/EEA which would trigger the
application of Article 4(1)(a) or where the processing is not carried out in the
context of such an establishment." Id. at 20 (emphasis omitted).
67. WP 179, supra note 66, at 29.
68. WP 56, supra note 64, at 5. Article 4(1)(c) of the Directive states that its
provisions shall apply when "the controller is not established on Community
territory and, for purposes of processing personal data makes use of equipment,
automated or otherwise, situated on the territory of the said Member State, unless
such equipment is used only for purposes of transit through the territory of the
Community." Directive 95/46, supra note 6, art. 4(1)(c). According to the Working
Party, the data controller must engage in some kind of activity which utilizes the
equipment and have the intention to process personal data. WP 56, supra note 64, at
9.
69. WP 179, supra note 66, at 20.
70. WP 56, supra note 64, at 9.
71. WP 179, supra note 66, at 20.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 20-21.
74. Id. at 2 (Executive Summary); Recital 20 of the Directive also employs the
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non-EU-based data controller could use equipment located in an EU
Member State to process data that has no real connection with the
EU/EEA, but to which the Directive still applies. 75
To illustrate these concepts, the Working Party offers the
example of an online agenda service where the data controller will
sometimes be the service provider and sometimes the user. In the
former instance, the data subject, a user who may have no
relationship with the European Union, uploads personal
information to an online program, which the service provider
organizes and synchronizes. "If the cloud service provider uses
means in the EU, it will be subject to EU data protection law ....
[T]he application of the Directive would not be triggered by means
used for transit purposes only, but it would be triggered by more
specific equipment e.g. if the service uses calculating facilities, runs
java scripts or installs cookies with the purpose of storing and
retrieving personal data of users."7 6 In the latter case, where the
user is the data controller, a company may be using an online
agenda service that itself has no connection to the European Union
to schedule meetings with clients. "If the company uses the service
in the context of the activities of its establishment in the European
Union, EU law will be applicable to this processing of data via the
agenda on-line. . . ."n
Now that essentially all business is conducted and stored
electronically, and given the Directive's potentially broad reach, it is
not difficult to imagine myriad examples, such as those noted above,
of practices that produce data that implicate privacy laws in several
jurisdictions. In fact, for some businesses, such as social networking
sites and internet companies, it may be harder to imagine ways in
which the data they generate and collect might not be subject to the
laws of more than one country. Data created by a multinational
company and stored in the United States could implicate the
Directive if it originated in the European Union, if it were processed
in the context of activities of the enterprise's establishment in the
European Union, or if it were otherwise processed using equipment
located in a Member State. For the purposes of discovery, the fact
that the data is retrieved from servers on U.S. soil does not
term "means." Directive 95/46, supra note 6.
75. WP 56, supra note 64, at 7.
76. WP 179, supra note 66, at 22.
77. Id.
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necessarily exempt it from European privacy regulations.78
Web 2.0 and networking sites further complicate the issue
because users located in several different countries may contribute
to a project on such sites. Preserving data created in this way, even
on a server located in the United States, could implicate the rights of
contributing EU data subjects. 79 The ways in which individuals and
corporations use these services is expanding, which means that
information produced through these collaborative processes will
become increasingly relevant to all types of litigation.80
Furthermore, a laptop or a smartphone can be "equipment" for
purposes of the Directive. When a website places a cookie on the
computer of a data subject located in a Member State, the
information communicated back to the web site controller, no
matter where that controller is located, is subject to the protocols of
the Directive.81 The same applies to programs like Java Scripts that
allow remote servers to introduce information onto an individual's
computer. 82 In the words of the Article 29 Working Party: "The
controller decided to use this equipment for the purpose of
processing personal data and . .. several technical operations take
place without the control of the data subject. The controller
disposes over the user's equipment and this equipment is not used
only for purposes of transit through Community territory."8 3 Thus,
EU law applies.
78. Theoretically, a company which has no establishment in any Member State,
such as the online agenda service provider, but that targets customers in the
European Union, has an obligation to comply with the data protection laws of
every Member State to which it directs activities. If this company preserves data for
litigation in the United States, it may be penalized in multiple EU countries.
79. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 5/2009 on Online Social
Networking 6-7 (No. 01189/09/EN, WP 163, 2009) [hereinafter WP 163]. Although the
considerations can become quite complex, in general, users of sites such as Facebook
and Google Plus are classified as "data subjects" who are exempt from the Directive's
restrictions because they are processing data "in the course of a purely personal or
household activity." Directive 95/46, supra note 6, arts. 2(a) and 3(2). This is known as
the "household exemption." Operators of those sites, however, are considered "data
controllers" and are fully subject to the Directive. WP 163, supra at 5.
80. Although social networking discovery is currently used most frequently in
individual-oriented litigation, such as personal injury suits, rather than in complex
corporate disputes, its overall use is rising. Stephen W. Green, Social Media and E-
Discovery: Impact and Influence, 2 BLOOMBERG LAW REPORTS - CORPORATE COUNSEL, 1 (2011).
81. WP 56, supra note 64, at 10-11.
82. Id. at 11-12.
83. Id. at 11.
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In a likely scenario, a U.S.-based executive may travel
throughout Europe sending and receiving information on his
personal devices that could eventually be subject to a litigation hold
in the United States. Because those devices are classified as
"equipment" under the Directive, and may, at some point, be
located within EU territory when data is processed, much of that
information could be subject to Directive protocols. 84
In short, even if multinational companies, after instituting a
litigation hold, only preserve evidence on servers in the United
States, and continue to allow data kept in foreign offices to be
expunged, information held in the Unitd States may still fall within
the ambit of European Union data protection laws. Currently, the
likelihood that European regulators would prosecute such a
violation seems remote, especially since they have historically
focused on violations resulting from data transfers and production of
information for discovery. However, data protection authorities
realize that effective protection of the privacy of data subjects within
the European Union requires a globalized approach and regulators
are preparing to take a tougher stance against transgressors.
C. The Trend Towards Increased Enforcement of European Union
Data Protection Laws
The extent to which data protection laws are enforced varies
across the European Union, but recent trends indicate that lenient,
localized enforcement is giving way to stricter sanctions and cross-
border cooperation among regulators. Although adequate funding
for DPAs across the European Union has been and may continue to
be a problem, governments are reinvigorating these bodies with
greater enforcement responsibilities. Additionally, consumers,
themselves, are more aware of their privacy rights, and now report
transgressions to the appropriate authorities, or use social media to
focus attention on privacy breaches, which allows regulators to
enforce with confidence.85
Perhaps one of the most significant developments is the ever-
84. In fact, just taking that data out of Europe to the United States could violate
data transfer rules, unless the company at issue adheres to the Safe Harbor Scheme
or has approved Binding Corporate Rules.
85. Privacy at the Crossroads: Current Trends in Global Privacy Enforcement, HUNToN &
WILuAMS LLP (Jan. 12, 2012) [hereinafter Privacy Webinar], http://www.hunton.com/
media/20120112-privacywebinar/player.htnl (last visited Nov. 6, 2012).
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increasing amount of monetary sanctions. Previously, fines levied
against companies for violating data protection laws, if assessed at
all, had been low in all but a few cases. 86 A turning point occurred
in March 2011 when the French DPA, the CNIL,87 fined Google a
record C100,000 for unlawfully gathering Street View data. 88 The
move indicated the CNIL's serious stance towards enforcement, 89
and is representative of a newfound willingness on the part of
European regulators to take on large corporations like Google and
Facebook. 90 In the UK, the Information Commissioner's Office
(ICO), issued its first fine of E100,000 in November 201091 and has
threatened sanctions of up to £375,000 since then.92
Several EU Member States have also begun aggressively using
privacy audits as an enforcement tool. In France alone, the number
of audits rose from 100 to 300 between 2005 and 2010 and the CNIL
plans to significantly increase that number even further.93 Both the
86. PROPOSED EU DATA PROTECTION REGULATION - JANUARY 25, 2012 DRAFT:
WHAT US COMPANIES NEED To KNow (Jan. 2012), http://www.itlawgroup.com/
resources/articles/ 230-proposed-eu-data-protection-regulation-january-25-2012-
draft-what-us-companies-should-know-.htm1 (last visited Nov. 3, 2012); See also UK
Information Commissioner Wields First Fines for Violations of Data Protection Act,
COVINGTON & BURLING ADVISORY - GLOBAL PRIVACY & DATA SECURITY (Dec. 21, 2010)
(UK Information Commissioner assesses first fines under the 1998 Data Protection
Act in November of 2010).
87. Commission nationale de l'informatique et des liberths.
88. Privacy Webinar, supra note 85.
89. Eric , Google Faces French Fine for Breach of Privacy, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21,
2011), avialable at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/22/technology/22
privacy.html.
90. Privacy Webinar, supra note 85; Google Bosses Convicted in Italy, BBC.coM
(February 24, 2010, 12:38 GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8533695.stm (last
visited Nov. 3, 2012) (Reporting that in 2010, Google Global Privacy Counsel Peter
Fleischer and two other executives were convicted of violating the Italian privacy
code for transmission of an offensive video). On February 2, 2012, the Article 29
Working Party announced that it had designated CNIL, the French data protection
authority to complete an analysis of Google's new privacy policies and asked the
company to "pause" changes to the procedures. Letter from Article 29 Working
Party to Google Inc. (Feb. 2. 2012).
91. The UK Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) was authorized to impose
fines under the Data Protection Act of 1998 in November of 2010. UK INFORMATION
COMMISSIONER WIELDS FIRST FINES FOR VIOLATIONS OF DATA PROTECTION ACT, supra
note 86.
92. Fine After Brighton Hospital's Hard Drives Stolen, BBC (Nov. 1, 2012),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-sussex-16502602.
93. Privacy Webinar, supra note 85; Sylvie Rousseau et al., France - An Update on
the CNIL and Data Protection Enforcement, LINKLATERS (Sept. 20, 2011),
http://www.linklaters.com/Publications/Publicationl403Newsletter/TMT-
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ICO in the UK and the Irish DPA have augmented their use of
audits as well. 94 Still, European regulators and DPAs are calling for
even broader power to regulate, enforce, and fine.95
Amidst this climate of intensified monitoring and enforcement
within Europe, regulators have also begun approaching their duties
from a stance of longer arm jurisdiction. DPAs are being imbued
with extended power to regulate and impose fines 96 and have begun
collaborating across jurisdictions in an unprecedented way - a
manifestation of the cross-border nature of data processing today. 97
D. The Proposed Data Privacy Regulation
The most significant harbinger of what is to come, however, is
the European Commission's announcement on January 25, 2012 of
comprehensive reforms to the 1995 Directive that would update and
modernize the law.98 The legislation is still in its preliminary stages,
and subject to change, but the European Commission has
highlighted certain key modifications to the existing framework that
the reforms will include. Broadly defined, the proposed law creates
affirmative obligations and increased accountability for
organizations operating in and serving the European Union while
augmenting protection for the rights of individuals. A major goal of
the new legislation is to strengthen the role of DPAs, especially in
the area of enforcement, to facilitate more effective compliance with
data protection initiatives within the European Union. Unlike the
newsletter-September-2011/Pages/enforcement.aspx (last visited Nov. 3, 2012).
94. Privacy Webinar, supra note 85.
95. Both Peter Hustinx, the European Data Protection Supervisor, and Jacob
Kohnstamm, the Chair of the Article 29 Working Party have been vocal about the
need for increased accountability for data controllers and greater enforcement
powers for DPAs. Id.; European Data Protection Supervisor, Press Release, Reform
of EU Data Protection Law: EDPS Calls on the European Commission to Be
Ambitious in Its Approach (Apr. 29, 2010), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleases
Action.do?reference=EDPS/ 10/8.
96. The UK Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) was authorized to impose
fines under the Data Protection Act of 1998 in November of 2010. UK INFORMATION
COMMISSIONER WIELDS FIRST FINES FOR VIOLATIONS OF DATA PROTECTION ACT, supra
note 86.
97. Privacy Webinar, supra note 85.
98. The proposed new regime would be set forth in a regulation, which would
have binding legal force across the Member States. This would be a significant step
towards harmonizing the EU data protection rules and provide much sought after
relief for companies who now navigate the differing privacy laws of each country
in the European Economic Area. COMMISSION PRESS RELEASE, supra note 46.
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current regime where some DPAs can only issue recommendations,
all DPAs under the regulation would have the power to impose
fines for violations, which could reach one million Euros, or up to
2% of a company's global annual turnover. 99
Additionally, in a deliberate step to clarify the European
Union's power to sanction privacy transgressions beyond its
borders, the regulation would stipulate: "EU rules must apply if
personal data is handled abroad by companies that are active in the
EU market and offer their services to EU citizens." 00  Thus,
lawmakers plan to explicitly empower data protection authorities to
regulate information held by companies outside the European
Union. In combination with additional tools to enforce compliance,
and a general intent to aggressively pursue infringers, the proposed
legislation would pave the way for DPAs to depart from the current
practice of localized enforcement. 101
The massive volumes of data being preserved for litigation by
multinationals operating in Europe fall squarely within the ambit of
the proposed new law, and regulators stand poised to chastise
offenders with a heavy hand. 102 Unfortunately for companies
operating in the European Union or just storing data to which the
Directive may apply, the threat of prosecution in Europe does not
absolve them of the obligation to fulfill their duty to issue litigation
holds and preserve relevant data for reasonably foreseeable
litigation in U.S. courts.
IV. The American Attitude: Treatment of Non-U.S. Data
Privacy Laws in U.S. Courts
In American jurisprudence, it is well established that non-U.S.
privacy laws do not preempt the power of an American court to
order production of evidence for discovery purposes. This remains
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. PROPOSED EU DATA PROTECTION REGULATION - JANUARY 25, 2012 DRAFT:
WHAT US COMPANIES NEED To KNow, supra note 86.
102. Id. As Google Global Privacy Counsel Peter Fleischer put it bluntly in his
blog post of JANUARY 2, 2012, "there's going to be a lot more privacy enforcement
actions. By a lot of different government authorities, not just DPAs. And the
sanctions/damages are going to go through the roof." Peter Fleischer, Peter
Fleischer: Privacy... ?: Harsher Data Protection Sanctions Are Coming, PETER FLEISCHER:
PRIVACY...? (Jan. 2, 2012, 4:08 PM), http://peterfleischer.blogspot.com/2012/01
/harsher -data-protection-sanctions-are.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2012).
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true even if a litigant would be subject to civil or criminal penalties
under foreign law for producing the information.103 Data protection
laws, such as European Data Protection Directive 95/46 and its
predecessors, are not the only type of legislation that can hinder the
success of international discovery. Several European nations have
enacted blocking statutes, which are designed for the express
purpose of thwarting discovery for U.S.-based litigation. Although
both privacy laws and blocking statutes prevent the transfer of
certain kinds of documents to the United States for use in a legal
proceeding, blocking statutes arose from contempt for American-
style discovery rather than the desire to protect substantive privacy
rights.104 In addition, the United States is a signatory to the Hague
Convention on Taking of Evidence Abroad (the Hague Evidence
Convention or the Convention), 05 which "prescribes certain
procedures by which a judicial authority in one contracting state
may request evidence located in another contracting state." 06
Blocking statutes, data protection laws, and the Hague Evidence
Convention, if invoked, can all thwart a litigant's ability to fulfill an
international discovery obligation. At the same time, litigants who
fail to comply with discovery orders may be subject to sanctions in
U.S. courts. As noted above, difficulties in resolving this conflict
usually arise in the context of orders to produce information for
discovery and often involve data that must be collected overseas
and transferred to the United States. Nonetheless, the principles
developed to address the laws concerning production of ESI may
become increasingly important at the preservation stage of the
discovery process because of the intensified enforcement efforts
from Europe, even where data transfers are not at issue.
103. Soci6t6 Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. District Court, 482 U.S.
522, 544 (1987); See also Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et
Commerciales, S. A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 212 (1958).
104. PROSKAUER ROSE LLP, Proskauer on International Litigation and Arbitration:
Managing, Resolving, and Avoiding Cross-Border Business or Regulatory Disputes,
PROSKAUER, ch. 4, sec. 2, available at http://www.proskauerguide.com
/litigation/4/II.
105. See generally Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or
Commercial Matters, Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555.
106. Adrospatiale, 482 U.S. at 524.
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A. The Case Law Governing the Applicability of Foreign Privacy
Laws in U.S. Courts
In the foundational case, Socidt6 Nationale Industrielle Afrospatiale
v. U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, the Supreme
Court established the bases for two important precedents regarding
document production from foreign jurisdictions. First, the Hague
Evidence Convention is not the exclusive means for obtaining
evidence located abroad, nor must litigants resort first to
Convention procedures whenever discovery is sought
extraterritorially. 107 Second, the Court approved a balancing test set
forth in the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the
United States to guide judges in determining whether to order
litigants to produce information despite claims that they could
suffer penalties under foreign law for doing so. 108 This analysis,
which embodies principles of international comity, fairness to
litigants, evidentiary necessity and procedural fairness, applies
broadly to blocking statutes and data protection laws alike. Since
the Adrospatiale decision, use of the test has frequently resulted in
pro-forum results, 109 in part because American courts are generally
hostile towards blocking statutes.110 However, judges in the United
States are increasingly adept at accommodating non-U.S.
substantive data protection laws."'
Nevertheless, while U.S. courts may be more deferential to
European privacy laws than blocking statutes, they are "often so
107. Id. at 529, 542.
108. Id. at 556.
109. See In re Global Power Equip. Group Inc., 418 B.R. 833, 850 (Bankr. D. Del.
2009); but see Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 262 F.R.D. 136, 152 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) ("[T]he
above factors weigh in favor of denying Arab Bank's discovery of the Protected
Materials."); see also Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468,
1478 (9th Cir. 1992) ("We therefore conclude that the order compelling discovery
should be upheld in spite of the PRC secrecy statute.").
110. The Court in Aerospatiale noted, "The American Law Institute has
summarized this interplay of blocking statutes and discovery orders: '[W]hen a
state has jurisdiction to prescribe and its courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate,
adjudication should (subject to generally applicable rules of evidence) take place on
the basis of the best information available [Blocking] statutes that frustrate this
goal need not be given the same deference by courts of the United States as
substantive rules of law at variance with the law of the United States.' See
Restatement, § 437, Reporter's Note 5, pp. 41, 42." Adrospatiale, 482 U.S. at 544 n.29.
111. Even the Article 29 Working Party has recognized that U.S. courts have
become more sensitive to the reality of enforced compliance with data protection
laws in Europe since Adrospatiale. WP 158, supra note 56, at 6.
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tied to the liberal domestic discovery practice that they fail to fully
appreciate the scope of data privacy laws worldwide, especially in
the EU."112 In Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A., the district court
determined it was proper to compel production of documents
located abroad after conducting a systematic analysis of the factors
articulated in the Afrospatiale balancing test. Specifically, the court
considered:
(1) the importance to the ... litigation of the documents or other
information requested; (2) the degree of specificity of the request;
(3) whether the information originated in the United States; (4) the
availability of alternative means of securing the information; and
(5) the extent to which noncompliance with the request would
undermine important interests of the United States, or compliance
with the request would undermine the important interests of the
state where the information is located.113
The fifth factor, the comity factor, which entails assessment of the
competing interests of the United States and the nation from which
discovery is sought, was "of the greatest importance in determining
whether to defer to the foreign jurisdiction." 114  Applying the
Adrospatiale factors to the specific facts of the Strauss case, the court
concluded that the U.S. interest in "fully and fairly adjudicating
matters before its courts,"11 5 outweighed the French interest in
having its privacy laws enforced.1 16
In terms of synchronicity with the European Data Protection
Directive, it is noteworthy that the Aerospatiale factors contemplate
whether the relevant information originated in the United States,
rather than where the data is or has been located or processed. In
Strauss, the plaintiffs obtained bank documents from France without
112. Tripp Haston & Lindsey Boney, The Unique Challenge of Serving Two Masters:
European Data Privacy Laws & United States Discovery Obligations, WHo's WHO
LEGAL (June 2011), http://www.whoswholegal.com/news/features/ article/29097
/the-unique-challenge-serving-two-masters-european-data-privacy-laws-united-
states-discovery-obligations.
113. Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A., 242 F.R.D. 199, 210 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
114. Id. at 213.
115. Id. at 214 (quoting Minpeco, S.A. v. Conticommodity Services, Inc., 116
F.R.D. 517, 523-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)).
116. Id. at 222 ("Credit Lyonnais's purported obligations to preserve bank
customer secrecy (Article L 511-33), and comply with French anti-money laundering
and anti-terrorism laws (Articles L 561-1 to L 563-5), judicial secrecy laws (Articles 11
and 434-7-2) and the French blocking statute (French Law No. 68-678), do not
preclude the bank from responding to plaintiffs' discovery demands...").
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the consent of the bank or its customer and argued they were
discoverable because they were located in the United States where
the French privacy law did not apply. The court rejected this
argument stating it was "unaware of any precedent which ignores
the bank-customer relationship simply because the documents at
issue are currently located in the United States."117 The court
pointed out that the Restatement factors address where the
documents "originated," not where they are "located." 1 8
The Strauss decision shows some respect for the French privacy
statutes, but it also underscores the ad hoc, case law-oriented
analytical framework American courts use to determine the
applicability of non-U.S. data protection laws. How would the
Restatement factors resolve the issue of whose law applies to an
email sent from Europe to the United States? Or even more
perplexing, where do Web 2.0 documents, such as the hypothetical
online agenda discussed, supra, originate?
Since Adrospatiale, numerous cases have addressed the
incongruity between the privacy interests protected by European
legislation and the needs of parties to U.S. litigation to obtain
discovery. The outcomes are dependent on the unique facts of a
particular case, and the court's consideration of each factor in the
balancing test. Still, themes are emerging in the case law that are
relevant to application of non-U.S. data protection laws at the
preservation stage.
For example, litigants may need to prove that authorities in the
foreign jurisdiction will enforce the non-U.S. privacy law against
them for producing information in violation of a foreign law. The
Strauss court found it persuasive that there was no "indication that
civil or criminal prosecutions by the French government or civil
suits by [bank customers were] likely, rather than mere
possibilities." 119 In United States v. First National City Bank, the court
heard extensive testimony from German law experts before
concluding that the party resisting production of bank documents
"would not be subject to criminal sanctions or their equivalent
under German law." 120 The judge found "that there was only a
'remote and speculative' possibility that [the party] would not have
117. Id. at 209.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 224.
120. United States v. First Nat'1 City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 900 (2d Cir. 1968).
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a valid defense if it were sued for civil damages" in Germany. 121
These cases represent a trend in U.S. litigation: lack of prior
prosecutions under the statute alleged to be violated by compliance
with the discovery request weighs in favor of ordering
production.122 However, even a showing that there have been
prosecutions for violations of the non-U.S. law may leave an
American judge undeterred.
In 2007, for the first time, the French Supreme Court sustained
criminal penalties and fines against a French lawyer who violated a
blocking statute when he tried to obtain evidence in France for U.S.-
based litigation.123 But, since that conviction, U.S. courts have
continued to order discovery from France. 124 For example, in a 2009
case, In re Global Power, the court concluded that, despite evidence of
enforcement, the chance of prosecution remained "minimal,"
especially in light of the fact that the party opposing discovery
"identified only one case where the French Blocking Statute ha[d]
been used to prosecute a French national for engaging in discovery
without going through the Hague [Evidence Convention]
Procedures." 125 The court quoted precedent decided prior to the
French lawyer's conviction in 2007 for the proposition that "the
French Blocking Statute does not subject defendants to a realistic
risk of prosecution."126 EU regulators have not yet held companies
liable for their mass preservation of evidence in the United States, so
demonstrating there is a possibility of prosecution for this practice,
even in the face of increased enforcement in Europe, could prove
difficult.
In Columbia Pictures v. Bunnell, the court noted "[a] party relying
on foreign law has the burden of showing that such law bars the
121. Id.
122. See United States v. Vetco Inc., 691 F.2d 1281, 1289 (9th Cir. 1981) ("No case
has been cited in which a person has been prosecuted for complying with a court
order enforcing an IRS summons.").
123. Gareth T. Evans & Farrah Pepper, Court Holds U.S. Discovery Rules Trump
French Law and Hague Convention, 9 DIGITAL DISCOVERY & E-EVIDENCE 1, 3 (2009),
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/Evans-Pepper-Court
Holds USDiscoveryRules.pdf.
124. Id. at 1; See also In re Air Cargo Shipping Services Antitrust Litig., 278 F.R.D.
51, 54-55 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (ordering production of documents despite violation of
the French blocking statute).
125. Id. at 849.
126. Id. at 850.
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discovery in issue," and Defendants in the action had not met this
burden.127 In that case, the defendants used a third-party web
hosting service to store data in the Netherlands. 128 The court
ordered them to preserve and produce information held there by a
Dutch company despite Defendants' claim that the Netherlands
Personal Data Protection Act barred them from producing the
relevant information. 129 The magistrate judge found that the IP
addresses, at issue in the case, identified computers, not individuals,
and so did not fall within the ambit of "identifying information,"
which was the type of data to which the Dutch statute applied.o30
The judge's final order, however, still reserved the right to require
production, if necessary, in a form that did not mask the IP address
holders' identities.131 Thus, while deferring at first to European
privacy principles, the judge's main concerns lay with American
values of broad discovery.
Similarly, it is significant that the magistrate judge in Bunnell
seemed to consider preservation a lesser evil than production. In
her emphasis on the rule from Airospatiale she adds a telling
parenthetical: "[F]oreign blocking statutes do not deprive an
American court of the power to order a party subject to its
jurisdiction to produce (let alone preserve) evidence even though the
act of production may violate that statute." 132 Under the European
Data Protection Directive, however, preservation is "data
processing" and information stored in this way is subject to legal
limitations.
The Bunnell opinion also highlights the reality that litigants
claiming non-U.S. law bars discovery face an even higher burden
than they would arguing for application of other areas of non-U.S.
law. 133 The court may conduct its own research to determine the
127. Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Bunnell, 245 F.R.D. 443, 452 (C.D. Cal. 2007)
(quoting United States v. Vetco Inc., 691 F.2d 1281, 1289 (9th Cir. 1981)).
128. Id at 452.
129. Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Bunnell, No. CV 06-1093FMCJCX, 2007 WL
2080419, at *11 (C.D. Cal. May 29, 2007).
130. Id.
131. Id. at *14 ("[D]efendant [sic] are not, at least at this juncture, ordered to
produce such IP addresses in an unmasked/unencrypted form.").
132. Id. at *12 (emphasis added).
133. PROSKAUER ROSE LLP, supra note 104, at ch. 8, § 3; see also Strauss v. Cr6dit
Lyonnais, S.A., 242 F.R.D. 199, 207 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (The party resisting discovery
must show that "such law actually bars the production or testimony at issue . ."
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relevance of foreign law, but it is under no obligation to do so.134 A
court is also free to give little or no weight to a party's submissions
on the applicability of foreign law. 135  With such amorphous
guidelines, the extent to which European data protection laws will
be interpreted in accordance with their legislative intent as
understood by the Member States to which they apply is variable.
Indeed, a good example of a misinterpretation is the magistrate
judge's assumption in Bunnell that requiring preservation of data
located in the Netherlands was legally less onerous than ordering
production of that information.
A lack of expertise in the applicable foreign law on the part of
American judges may mean that even their good-faith attempts to
try to accommodate the needs of litigants facing a conflict of laws
due to discovery requests could be misguided.136 And while
European regulators have not vigorously enforced violations of the
Directive resulting from judicial misapplication of and disregard for
EU privacy laws in American courts, they have begun devoting
more attention to the issue.
B. European Regulators Callfor Dialogue
On February 11, 2009, through publication of Working Party
Paper 158 on Pre-Trial Discovery for Cross-Border Civil Litigation
(WP 158), EU authorities officially addressed the growing tension
and "describe, inter alia, the provisions of the foreign law, the basis for its relevance,
and the application of the foreign law to the facts of the case.") (internal quotations
omitted) (emphasis omitted); see also Weiss v. Nat'l Westminster Bank, PLC, 242
F.R.D. 33, 40 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) ("[Tlhe party resisting discovery must provide the
Court with information of sufficient particularity and specificity to allow the Court
to determine whether the discovery sought is indeed prohibited by foreign law.")
(internal quotations omitted).
134. Bel-Ray Comp., Inc. v. Chemrite (PTY) Ltd., 181 F.3d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 1999)
("This rule provides courts with broad authority to conduct their own independent
research to determine foreign law but imposes no duty upon them to do so.").
135. Euromepa, S.A. v. R. Esmerian, Inc., 154 F.3d 24, 28 n.2 (2d Cir. 1998)
(noting federal courts "are not required to take all allegations of [foreign] law
proffered by [a party] to be true").
136. For example, in some situations similar data is held both in Europe and in
the United States. In such scenarios, when a production order could expose a
litigant to liability for violating a foreign data protection law, the court may order
production of the data that is held in the United States rather than the same type of
data held in Europe. However, as shown, if the data falls within the jurisdiction of
the Directive, the fact that it is located in the United States is irrelevant. The longer
arm of jurisdiction now reaching across the Atlantic could render concessions such
as this from U.S. judges moot.
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between the European interest in strong data protection laws and
the needs of litigants in U.S. courts to provide for broad
disclosure. 137 The paper is not, and does not claim to be, a
comprehensive set of guidelines to govern cross-border discovery
disputes; rather it enumerates certain discussion points in a call to
dialogue about the issue. Predictably, the document specifically
identifies preservation of information in anticipation of litigation as
"processing" subject to Directive protocols. 138 Although processing
for "compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is
subject" is one of the criteria that can make data processing
legitimate under the Data Protection Directive,139 the Working Party
states that "[a]n obligation imposed by a foreign legal statute or
regulation may not qualify as a legal obligation by virtue of which
data processing in the EU would be made legitimate."140 The paper
highlights the ways in which data can be lawfully disclosed under
the Directive and encourages U.S. lawyers to cooperate with
European data supervisory authorities.141
WP 158 references the Sedona Conference Framework for
Cross-Border Discovery (Cross-Border Discovery Framework) for
some of its conclusions about American jurisprudence regarding
conflicts between the European Union and United States over data
protection in discovery. The Cross-Border Discovery Framework is
a product of the Conference's Working Group 6 on International
Electronic Information Management, Discovery, and Disclosure
(WG6) which specifically addresses issues relevant to multinational
companies that may be subject to conflicting laws. The Cross-
Border Discovery Framework engages the kinds of problems that
the Working Party discusses, but from the perspective of U.S.
courts. 14 2 The WG6 responded to WP 158 with a letter accepting the
137. M. James Daley, A Call to Dialogue: EU Article 29 Data Protection Working
Party Document 158 on Discovery for Cross-Border Civil Litigation, GEORGETOWN LAW -
E-DISCOVERY LAW BLOG (Nov. 10, 2009, 9:33 AM), http://www.law.georgetown.edu
/cleblog/post.cfm/a-call-to-dialogue-eu-article-29-data-protection-working-party-
document-158-on-discovery-for-cross-border-civil-litigation.
138. WP 158, supra note 56, at 8.
139. Directive 95/46, supra note 6, art. 7(c).
140. WP 158, supra note 56, at 9.
141. Id. at 10.
142. For more information on the Sedona Conference See The Sedona
Conference, Frequently Asked Questions, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS,
https://thesedonaconference.org/faq.
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invitation to dialogue.143
The WG6's letter directly addresses preservation issues that the
Working Party raises in WP 158. In an attempt to assuage some of
the Working Party's concerns, the WG6 highlights the fact that "a
party need only preserve relevant information" and discovery
requests are "subject to limitations of proportionality and concerns
for privacy and confidentiality." 44 While this response is consistent
with the Sedona Conference's framework for analysis and best
practices principles, 145 it largely ignores the reality that many
multinationals are data hoarders and over-preservers. 146
The goal of this transnational dialogue between the Working
Party and the WG6 appears to be a "win-win" situation where data
minimization practices that bring companies into compliance with
EU laws in turn result in lower discovery costs for American
litigants.147 While that is certainly a rosy possibility, developed
extensively in conference papers and working documents it seems
an unlikely reality in the near future. The competing values - broad
discovery as the foundation of our adversarial system, and privacy
as a fundamental human right - are proving difficult to reconcile.
While cooperation can certainly achieve some level of comity, the
fact that U.S. preservation practices have attracted the interest of
European regulators may be more likely to lead to penalties rather
than compliance.
V. Conclusion
Faced with spoliation sanctions in the U.S. or preservation
sanctions in Europe, multinationals face a Hobson's choice.
However, until vigorous enforcement of preservation practices
eventuates, corporations are likely to maintain their current policies
because they ensure compliance with U.S. law under which
143. M. James Daley, Re: Comment of the Sedona Conference Working Group 6 to
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party Working Document 1/2009 ("IAP 158"), 1, 3
(2009).
144. Id. at 7.
145. See SEDONA BEST PRACTICES, supra note 12 at 11.
146. The Sedona Conference recognizes that multinationals are data hoarders in
its Recommendations for BEST Practices, but suggests this is a result of bad records
management strategies and is not necessary. Id. at 21.
147. Joshua Kubicki, Yes, There Is Such a Thing as EU Data Privacy, LEGAL
TRANSFORMATION: THE LEGAL PROFESSION (Feb. 25, 2010), http://www.legal
transformationblog.com/2010/0 2 /yes-us-there-is-such-thing-as-eu-data.html.
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spoliation sanctions appear much more real. Unlike the laxity that
has characterized European data protection enforcement, U.S. courts
remain undeterred by the possibility that their discovery orders will
obligate litigants to violate foreign laws. Times are changing,
though, and European data protection authorities are entering a
new era of increased enforcement. Soon to be armed with a new
EU-wide regulation and with the public already on their side,
regulators could begin sanctioning violations with a vengeance.
Whether they will single out multinational data hoarders in the
context of U.S. litigation remains to be seen, but those companies
should be wary. With both sides taking a strong stance, clashes are
inevitable.
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